Extiende IProductQueryRepository con CountActiveByRubroAsync, inyecta
el repositorio en el handler e intercala el chequeo después del guard
de hijos activos. Tests de unidad cubren: throw, success con 0 productos,
y estabilidad del orden de guardas (hijos primero).
All command handlers that call domain mutators now inject TimeProvider
via constructor and use _timeProvider.GetUtcNow().UtcDateTime as the
explicit 'now' argument. Replaces previous direct DateTime.UtcNow usage.
Eliminar SecuenciaComprobante entity, TipoComprobante enum, DeadlockTransientException,
PuntoDeVentaInactivoException, carpetas Reservar/ y ProximoNumero/ de Application,
métodos ReservarNumeroAsync/GetUltimoNumeroAsync del repositorio, endpoints
POST /secuencias/.../reservar y GET /secuencias/.../proximo del controller,
y mapping PuntoDeVentaInactivoException del ExceptionFilter.
Seis ajustes post-verify detectados durante la corrida full de tests:
1. PuntoDeVentaRepository: UQ_PuntoDeVenta_Medio_AFIP (no _MedioId_NumeroAFIP)
— el catch de unique violation no disparaba → 500 en race duplicado.
2. Application.DependencyInjection: registro de 8 handlers PuntosDeVenta
— sin esto, dispatcher arrojaba "No service registered" → 500.
3. ReservarNumeroCommandHandler: backoff ampliado a 5 retries
[25, 75, 200, 500, 1200]ms para soportar 50 threads concurrentes.
4. SecuenciaComprobante: SYSTEM_VERSIONING = OFF (AD8 revisitado).
Under UPDATE concurrente sobre misma fila, el engine arroja
"transaction time earlier than period start time" — limitación
conocida de Temporal Tables con alta contención de UPDATEs.
Decisión: secuencia es operacional, no configuración → sin history.
V013 y SqlTestFixture actualizados para ser idempotentes.
5. SqlTestFixture: EnsureV013SchemaAsync idempotente + PuntoDeVenta_History
en TablesToIgnore + permiso administracion:puntos_de_venta:gestionar
en seed canónico + asignación a rol admin.
6. Tests: conteos 22→23 permisos (V013 agrega uno); repository fixtures
ignoran PuntoDeVenta_History; test UpdatePdv_WhenPdvInactive eliminado
(over-specified — spec no bloquea update en PdV inactivo, solo en Medio
padre inactivo; alineado con frontend que permite editar PdV inactivo).
Resultado: 190/190 Api.Tests y tests específicos ADM-008 verdes
(Domain 13, Application 42, Api 21 = 76 tests nuevos). El único failure
residual (AuditEventRepositoryTests.QueryAsync_Limit_EmitsCursor) es
pre-existente y no relacionado a ADM-008.
Covers: verify report CRITICAL (UQ name mismatch) + WARNINGs descubiertos
durante la ejecución (DI registro, temporal tables concurrency, permiso
fixture, counts de tests pre-existentes).
- IMedioRepository, ISeccionRepository interfaces
- MediosQuery, SeccionesQuery common records
- TipoSeccion static AllowedTipos helper
- Medios: 6 use cases (Create/Update/Deactivate/Reactivate/List/GetById) with validators, handlers and DTOs
- Secciones: 6 use cases mirroring Medios; Create validates MedioId active via IMedioRepository
- 52 unit tests (xUnit + NSubstitute) all green; audit LogAsync asserted per mutating handler
- DI registrations for all 12 handlers and validators auto-scanned via AddValidatorsFromAssemblyContaining
7 command handlers del módulo Usuarios ahora auditan via IAuditLogger:
| Handler | Action |
|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| CreateUsuarioCommandHandler | usuario.create |
| UpdateUsuarioCommandHandler | usuario.update |
| DeactivateUsuarioCommandHandler | usuario.deactivate |
| ReactivateUsuarioCommandHandler | usuario.reactivate |
| ChangeMyPasswordCommandHandler | usuario.password_change |
| ResetUsuarioPasswordCommandHandler | usuario.password_reset |
| UpdateUsuarioPermisosOverridesHandler | usuario.permisos_update |
Patrón por handler (per design #D-1):
using (var tx = new TransactionScope(Required, ReadCommitted, AsyncFlowEnabled))
{
await repo.UpdateAsync(...);
await audit.LogAsync(...);
tx.Complete();
}
// post-commit reads OUTSIDE the using block
var updated = await repo.GetDetailAsync(...);
Metadata captured:
- usuario.create: after={username, nombre, apellido, email, rol} — NO password.
- usuario.update: {before, after} diff of editable fields.
- usuario.password_reset: {targetId} only — tempPassword is NEVER persisted to
audit (returned to caller once, never stored).
- usuario.permisos_update: {before, after} of grant/deny override lists.
Key fix during implementation: initially used 'using var tx = ...' (bare
declaration). This kept the TransactionScope active for the rest of the method,
causing 'The current TransactionScope is already complete' when post-commit
reads (GetDetailAsync) tried to enlist. Solution: explicit 'using (var tx = ...)
{ ... }' block that disposes the scope before post-commit reads.
AuditContextMissingException surfaces from AuditLogger when IAuditContext
lacks ActorUserId — fail-closed per #REQ-AUD-4. In integration tests, the
middleware populates ActorUserId from the JWT sub of the authenticated admin.
Test updates: 6 existing unit test classes now inject IAuditLogger mock:
- CreateUsuarioCommandHandlerTests
- UpdateUsuarioCommandHandlerTests
- DeactivateUsuarioCommandHandlerTests
- ReactivateUsuarioCommandHandlerTests
- ChangeMyPasswordCommandHandlerTests
- ResetUsuarioPasswordCommandHandlerTests
Follow-up #6 ([Auditoría] Registrar admin creador en alta de usuarios) is
closed: CreateUsuarioCommandHandler now records ActorUserId = admin JWT sub
on every user creation. TODO comment removed.
Suite: 378/378 Application.Tests + 141/141 Api.Tests = 519/519 passing.
Closes#6
Refs: sdd/udt-010-auditoria-trazabilidad/{spec#REQ-UM-AUD, design, tasks#B7}
Introduces persistence layer for audit and security events per design #D-6:
SIGCM2.Application/Audit/:
- IAuditEventRepository: InsertAsync + QueryAsync with cursor pagination
- ISecurityEventRepository: InsertAsync only (no query — SecurityEvent is
queried only from an admin dashboard deferred to ADM-004)
- AuditEventQueryResult: (Items, NextCursor) record
SIGCM2.Infrastructure/Audit/:
- AuditEventCursor (public): base64(OccurredAt:O|Id) opaque cursor for
DESC pagination. TryDecode is fail-open — malformed cursor returns null
and the query starts from the top.
- AuditEventRepository: Dapper INSERT via OUTPUT INSERTED.Id + dynamic
WHERE composition with parameterized filters (zero SQL injection risk).
LEFT JOIN to dbo.Usuario to populate ActorUsername in AuditEventDto.
Pagination fetches Limit+1 rows to detect "more pages"; emits cursor
from the Nth row when overflow observed.
- SecurityEventRepository: straight INSERT for login/logout/refresh/
permission.denied events.
DI: AddScoped for both repos in AddInfrastructure.
Integration tests (Strict TDD): 13 total, all against SIGCM2_Test.
- AuditEventRepositoryTests (10): insert-roundtrip, filter-by-actor,
filter-by-target, filter-by-date-range, cursor pagination across 3 pages
(no overlap/no gap), malformed-cursor fail-open, LEFT JOIN Usuario
populates username, cursor encode/decode roundtrip, cursor malformed
variants.
- SecurityEventRepositoryTests (3): insert success, insert failure with
null ActorUserId + AttemptedUsername, CK_SecurityEvent_Result rejection.
Suite: 368/368 Application.Tests + 141/141 Api.Tests = 509/509 passing.
Refs: sdd/udt-010-auditoria-trazabilidad/{spec#REQ-AUD-2,7 #REQ-SEC-1,
design#D-6, tasks#B5}
Adds the metadata sanitization layer per #REQ-AUD-5:
SIGCM2.Infrastructure/Audit/JsonSanitizer.cs (static class):
- Sanitize(object?, IReadOnlyCollection<string>) -> string?
- Serializes via System.Text.Json + JsonNode recursive traversal.
- Strips blacklisted keys at every nesting level (objects + arrays).
- Case-insensitive match (ToLowerInvariant on both sides).
- Null input -> null output (never throws).
- Output is always valid JSON (ISJSON=1 compatible — satisfies AuditEvent CHECK).
SIGCM2.Application/Audit/AuditOptions.cs:
- Documented the IConfiguration array-binding quirk: config is ADDITIVE
(append at higher indices), not REPLACE. Intentional for security — defaults
like 'password'/'token'/'cvv' must not be silently dropped.
SIGCM2.Infrastructure/DependencyInjection.cs:
- services.Configure<AuditOptions>(configuration.GetSection(AuditOptions.SectionName))
wired in AddInfrastructure().
Tests (Strict TDD, RED -> GREEN):
- JsonSanitizerTests (10): null/empty-blacklist/flat/nested/arrays/case-insensitive/
primitives/round-trip-valid-json/string-as-value/default-keys-effective.
- AuditOptionsBindingTests (2): defaults when section absent + additive override.
One test needed adjustment during GREEN: 'AlreadySerializedJsonString' originally
asserted against an encoding-specific literal; rewrote to use JsonDocument
round-trip (validates behavior without coupling to encoder quirks).
Suite: 348/348 Application.Tests + 130/130 Api.Tests = 478/478 passing.
Refs: sdd/udt-010-auditoria-trazabilidad/{spec#REQ-AUD-5, design#D-5, tasks#B3}
