Banner advertencia visible al mount con tokens warning-bg/warning-border [REQ-UI-005].
Filtros por codigo y activo. Paginacion server-side. Modales create/edit/nueva-version
controlados por estado local. 12 tests RTL pasan.
Preview en tiempo real: nuevo porcentaje, fecha cierre = vigenciaDesde-1d.
Banner warning con tokens DS. Boton disabled si form invalido [REQ-UI-004].
7 tests RTL pasan incluyendo verificacion de fecha cierre correcta.
Modal de edicion solo cosmeticos (Codigo, Descripcion, AplicaIVA, Activo).
Campo Porcentaje ausente en modo edit — verificado con queryByLabelText null [REQ-UI-003].
Modo create incluye Porcentaje inicial + VigenciaDesde. 10 tests RTL pasan.
Columnas: Codigo, Descripcion, Porcentaje%, Vigencia (abierta si null),
Estado (badge), Version con HistorialCadenaTooltip lazy. Acciones: editar,
nueva vigencia, deactivate/reactivate toggle. 10 tests RTL pasan.
useTiposDeIvaList, useTipoDeIva, useHistorialTipoDeIva (lazy enable),
mutations con invalidateQueries. staleTime: 15_000 en todas las queries.
Query keys estables: ['fiscal', 'iva', ...].
Tokens usados en banner de advertencia fiscal (ADM-009). Incluye variante
light (amber claro) y dark (amber oscuro), mapeados en @theme inline de Tailwind.
Eliminar SecuenciaComprobante entity, TipoComprobante enum, DeadlockTransientException,
PuntoDeVentaInactivoException, carpetas Reservar/ y ProximoNumero/ de Application,
métodos ReservarNumeroAsync/GetUltimoNumeroAsync del repositorio, endpoints
POST /secuencias/.../reservar y GET /secuencias/.../proximo del controller,
y mapping PuntoDeVentaInactivoException del ExceptionFilter.
Gap detectado durante smoke: la DetailPage tenia los hooks
useReservarNumero/useProximoNumero creados en Batch 6 pero faltaba
el componente que los consume.
SecuenciasPanel.tsx: tabla con los 6 tipos AFIP (FacturaA/B/C, NC A/B/C),
proximo numero por tipo, boton Reservar. Toast con el numero reservado.
Deshabilitado si PdV o Medio padre estan inactivos.
Integrado en PuntoDeVentaDetailPage bajo guard de permiso.
Seis ajustes post-verify detectados durante la corrida full de tests:
1. PuntoDeVentaRepository: UQ_PuntoDeVenta_Medio_AFIP (no _MedioId_NumeroAFIP)
— el catch de unique violation no disparaba → 500 en race duplicado.
2. Application.DependencyInjection: registro de 8 handlers PuntosDeVenta
— sin esto, dispatcher arrojaba "No service registered" → 500.
3. ReservarNumeroCommandHandler: backoff ampliado a 5 retries
[25, 75, 200, 500, 1200]ms para soportar 50 threads concurrentes.
4. SecuenciaComprobante: SYSTEM_VERSIONING = OFF (AD8 revisitado).
Under UPDATE concurrente sobre misma fila, el engine arroja
"transaction time earlier than period start time" — limitación
conocida de Temporal Tables con alta contención de UPDATEs.
Decisión: secuencia es operacional, no configuración → sin history.
V013 y SqlTestFixture actualizados para ser idempotentes.
5. SqlTestFixture: EnsureV013SchemaAsync idempotente + PuntoDeVenta_History
en TablesToIgnore + permiso administracion:puntos_de_venta:gestionar
en seed canónico + asignación a rol admin.
6. Tests: conteos 22→23 permisos (V013 agrega uno); repository fixtures
ignoran PuntoDeVenta_History; test UpdatePdv_WhenPdvInactive eliminado
(over-specified — spec no bloquea update en PdV inactivo, solo en Medio
padre inactivo; alineado con frontend que permite editar PdV inactivo).
Resultado: 190/190 Api.Tests y tests específicos ADM-008 verdes
(Domain 13, Application 42, Api 21 = 76 tests nuevos). El único failure
residual (AuditEventRepositoryTests.QueryAsync_Limit_EmitsCursor) es
pre-existente y no relacionado a ADM-008.
Covers: verify report CRITICAL (UQ name mismatch) + WARNINGs descubiertos
durante la ejecución (DI registro, temporal tables concurrency, permiso
fixture, counts de tests pre-existentes).
8 endpoints en /api/v1/admin/puntos-de-venta con permiso administracion:puntos_de_venta:gestionar.
ExceptionFilter: +PuntoDeVentaNotFoundException (404), +PuntoDeVentaInactivoException (409), +NumeroAFIPDuplicadoException (409).
MedioInactivoException ya mapeado por ADM-001; no duplicado.
Reemplaza 13 <select>/<option> nativos en 8 archivos por el componente
shadcn Select (Radix UI). Los selects nativos ignoraban los tokens del
design system en dark mode, causando texto invisible. Se agrega mock de
pointer capture APIs en test setup para compatibilidad de Radix con jsdom.
- IMedioRepository, ISeccionRepository interfaces
- MediosQuery, SeccionesQuery common records
- TipoSeccion static AllowedTipos helper
- Medios: 6 use cases (Create/Update/Deactivate/Reactivate/List/GetById) with validators, handlers and DTOs
- Secciones: 6 use cases mirroring Medios; Create validates MedioId active via IMedioRepository
- 52 unit tests (xUnit + NSubstitute) all green; audit LogAsync asserted per mutating handler
- DI registrations for all 12 handlers and validators auto-scanned via AddValidatorsFromAssemblyContaining
Entities sealed immutable con factory ForCreation + copy-with methods
WithUpdatedProfile/WithActivo (Codigo inmutable en Medio; MedioId y
Codigo inmutables en Seccion — enforzado en Validators en B4).
Exceptions: MedioCodigoDuplicado (UQ global), SeccionCodigoDuplicadoEnMedio
(UQ compuesto), MedioNotFound, SeccionNotFound. Todas heredan de
DomainException.
Agrega Quartz.Extensions.Hosting 3.13.1 al catálogo central.
SIGCM2.Infrastructure/Audit/Jobs/:
- AuditPartitionManagerJob — mensual (cron '0 0 2 1 * ?', UTC). Extiende
pf_AuditEvent_Monthly y pf_SecurityEvent_Monthly con SPLIT RANGE para el
mes+2 (mantiene +1 de buffer). Idempotente: verifica existencia antes.
- AuditRetentionEnforcerJob — anual (cron '0 0 3 1 1 ?', UTC). DELETE rows
> 10 años en AuditEvent y > 5 años en SecurityEvent. Temporal history se
purga solo vía HISTORY_RETENTION_PERIOD del engine.
- AuditIntegrityCheckJob — semanal domingos (cron '0 0 1 ? * SUN', UTC).
Valida SYSTEM_VERSIONING=ON + partitions próximos 3 meses. Emite
SecurityEvent 'system.integrity_alert' failure via ISecurityEventLogger
cuando detecta inconsistencias.
AuditMaintenanceRegistration.cs:
- services.AddAuditMaintenance(configuration) wraps AddQuartz + AddQuartzHostedService
con los 3 triggers crónicos.
Program.cs:
- builder.Services.AddAuditMaintenance(configuration) wired ONLY en entornos
productivos — skipeado en 'Testing' para que los integration tests no
disparen los triggers cron durante el ciclo de vida del TestWebAppFactory.
Row-based DELETE en RetentionEnforcerJob es la opción conservadora para la
primera generación — cuando los volúmenes lo justifiquen (>200M filas), se
upgradea a SWITCH OUT + DROP para partition-level drop. Documentado en
comentario de la clase.
Tests (Strict TDD, integration):
- AuditJobsTests (3): PartitionManager crea target boundary + idempotencia,
RetentionEnforcer purga > threshold (10y audit, 5y security), IntegrityCheck
all-OK no emite alert.
Suite: 381/381 Application.Tests + 147/147 Api.Tests = 528/528 passing.
Refs: sdd/udt-010-auditoria-trazabilidad/{spec#REQ-AUD-6 #REQ-SEC-5, design, tasks#B11}
AuditController:
- GET /api/v1/audit/events?actorUserId&targetType&targetId&from&to&cursor&limit
- Protected by [RequirePermission("administracion:auditoria:ver")] — reuses
the existing permission (V005/V006 seed assigns it to admin).
- 400 on limit out of [1,100] or from > to.
- Cursor-based DESC pagination via AuditEventRepository.QueryAsync.
AuditHealthCheck (IHealthCheck):
- Validates SYSTEM_VERSIONING ON on Usuario/Rol/Permiso/RolPermiso.
- Validates partition boundaries exist for next 3 months (both AuditEvent and
SecurityEvent functions).
- Reports last audit event age (lenient 24h to accommodate dev/test quiet envs).
- Validates HISTORY_RETENTION_PERIOD == 10 YEARS on all 4 tables.
Key fix during impl: sys.tables.history_retention_period is stored in UNITS
(1=INFINITE, 3=DAY, 4=WEEK, 5=MONTH, 6=YEAR), NOT seconds. Assertion: period=10
AND unit=6 (10 YEARS).
- Mapped at /health/audit via app.MapHealthChecks with tag 'audit'.
Tests (Strict TDD, integration against SIGCM2_Test):
- AuditControllerTests (5): without-auth 401, without-permission 403 (cajero),
admin with filter returns events, invalid limit 400, from>to 400.
- AuditHealthCheckTests (1): returns Healthy with V010 applied.
Suite: 378/378 Application.Tests + 147/147 Api.Tests = 525/525 passing.
Refs: sdd/udt-010-auditoria-trazabilidad/{spec#REQ-AUD-7/8, design, tasks#B10}
7 command handlers del módulo Usuarios ahora auditan via IAuditLogger:
| Handler | Action |
|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| CreateUsuarioCommandHandler | usuario.create |
| UpdateUsuarioCommandHandler | usuario.update |
| DeactivateUsuarioCommandHandler | usuario.deactivate |
| ReactivateUsuarioCommandHandler | usuario.reactivate |
| ChangeMyPasswordCommandHandler | usuario.password_change |
| ResetUsuarioPasswordCommandHandler | usuario.password_reset |
| UpdateUsuarioPermisosOverridesHandler | usuario.permisos_update |
Patrón por handler (per design #D-1):
using (var tx = new TransactionScope(Required, ReadCommitted, AsyncFlowEnabled))
{
await repo.UpdateAsync(...);
await audit.LogAsync(...);
tx.Complete();
}
// post-commit reads OUTSIDE the using block
var updated = await repo.GetDetailAsync(...);
Metadata captured:
- usuario.create: after={username, nombre, apellido, email, rol} — NO password.
- usuario.update: {before, after} diff of editable fields.
- usuario.password_reset: {targetId} only — tempPassword is NEVER persisted to
audit (returned to caller once, never stored).
- usuario.permisos_update: {before, after} of grant/deny override lists.
Key fix during implementation: initially used 'using var tx = ...' (bare
declaration). This kept the TransactionScope active for the rest of the method,
causing 'The current TransactionScope is already complete' when post-commit
reads (GetDetailAsync) tried to enlist. Solution: explicit 'using (var tx = ...)
{ ... }' block that disposes the scope before post-commit reads.
AuditContextMissingException surfaces from AuditLogger when IAuditContext
lacks ActorUserId — fail-closed per #REQ-AUD-4. In integration tests, the
middleware populates ActorUserId from the JWT sub of the authenticated admin.
Test updates: 6 existing unit test classes now inject IAuditLogger mock:
- CreateUsuarioCommandHandlerTests
- UpdateUsuarioCommandHandlerTests
- DeactivateUsuarioCommandHandlerTests
- ReactivateUsuarioCommandHandlerTests
- ChangeMyPasswordCommandHandlerTests
- ResetUsuarioPasswordCommandHandlerTests
Follow-up #6 ([Auditoría] Registrar admin creador en alta de usuarios) is
closed: CreateUsuarioCommandHandler now records ActorUserId = admin JWT sub
on every user creation. TODO comment removed.
Suite: 378/378 Application.Tests + 141/141 Api.Tests = 519/519 passing.
Closes#6
Refs: sdd/udt-010-auditoria-trazabilidad/{spec#REQ-UM-AUD, design, tasks#B7}
Composes the audit emission layer per design #D-8:
SIGCM2.Infrastructure/Audit/AuditLogger.cs (IAuditLogger):
- Enriches from IAuditContext (ActorUserId/ActorRoleId/Ip/UserAgent/CorrelationId).
- Sanitizes metadata via JsonSanitizer + AuditOptions.SanitizedKeys.
- Persists via IAuditEventRepository.InsertAsync.
- Fail-closed: throws AuditContextMissingException when ActorUserId is null.
- Translates Guid.Empty correlation id to null (DB column is nullable; Empty
indicates 'no middleware ran').
- Uses System.DateTime.UtcNow for occurredAt.
SIGCM2.Infrastructure/Audit/SecurityEventLogger.cs (ISecurityEventLogger):
- NOT fail-closed: null ActorUserId is valid (login failures, anonymous
permission.denied events).
- Ip/UserAgent pulled from IAuditContext; metadata sanitized the same way.
- Persists via ISecurityEventRepository.
DI: AddScoped for both loggers in AddInfrastructure.
Tests (Strict TDD, mocks for IAuditContext/IAuditEventRepository/
ISecurityEventRepository):
- AuditLoggerTests (6): happy path with full context, fail-closed null actor,
metadata sanitization, null metadata pass-through, repo-throws-bubbles-up
(critical for TransactionScope rollback), custom SanitizedKeys from options.
- SecurityEventLoggerTests (4): login.success with context, login.failure
with null actor + attemptedUsername, metadata sanitization,
permission.denied with both actor and attemptedUsername null.
Two initial failures were fixed by replacing 'null' literal arguments in
NSubstitute Received(...) assertions with Arg.Is<T?>(x => x == null) —
NSubstitute does not always match null literals when mixed with Arg.Any<T>().
Suite: 378/378 Application.Tests + 141/141 Api.Tests = 519/519 passing.
Refs: sdd/udt-010-auditoria-trazabilidad/{spec#REQ-AUD-4 #REQ-SEC-2/3, design#D-8, tasks#B6}
Introduces persistence layer for audit and security events per design #D-6:
SIGCM2.Application/Audit/:
- IAuditEventRepository: InsertAsync + QueryAsync with cursor pagination
- ISecurityEventRepository: InsertAsync only (no query — SecurityEvent is
queried only from an admin dashboard deferred to ADM-004)
- AuditEventQueryResult: (Items, NextCursor) record
SIGCM2.Infrastructure/Audit/:
- AuditEventCursor (public): base64(OccurredAt:O|Id) opaque cursor for
DESC pagination. TryDecode is fail-open — malformed cursor returns null
and the query starts from the top.
- AuditEventRepository: Dapper INSERT via OUTPUT INSERTED.Id + dynamic
WHERE composition with parameterized filters (zero SQL injection risk).
LEFT JOIN to dbo.Usuario to populate ActorUsername in AuditEventDto.
Pagination fetches Limit+1 rows to detect "more pages"; emits cursor
from the Nth row when overflow observed.
- SecurityEventRepository: straight INSERT for login/logout/refresh/
permission.denied events.
DI: AddScoped for both repos in AddInfrastructure.
Integration tests (Strict TDD): 13 total, all against SIGCM2_Test.
- AuditEventRepositoryTests (10): insert-roundtrip, filter-by-actor,
filter-by-target, filter-by-date-range, cursor pagination across 3 pages
(no overlap/no gap), malformed-cursor fail-open, LEFT JOIN Usuario
populates username, cursor encode/decode roundtrip, cursor malformed
variants.
- SecurityEventRepositoryTests (3): insert success, insert failure with
null ActorUserId + AttemptedUsername, CK_SecurityEvent_Result rejection.
Suite: 368/368 Application.Tests + 141/141 Api.Tests = 509/509 passing.
Refs: sdd/udt-010-auditoria-trazabilidad/{spec#REQ-AUD-2,7 #REQ-SEC-1,
design#D-6, tasks#B5}
Wires the request-scoped audit context per design #D-2:
Middleware pipeline in Program.cs:
app.UseCors()
app.UseMiddleware<CorrelationIdMiddleware>() // PRE-AUTH
app.UseAuthentication()
app.UseMiddleware<AuditActorMiddleware>() // POST-AUTH
app.UseAuthorization()
app.MapControllers()
SIGCM2.Api/Middleware/CorrelationIdMiddleware.cs:
- Preserves client-sent X-Correlation-Id header when a valid GUID, otherwise
generates Guid.NewGuid(). Stores in HttpContext.Items (audit:correlationId).
- Captures Ip (Connection.RemoteIpAddress) + UserAgent header into Items.
- Echoes the correlation id back via response header (OnStarting + immediate
set — immediate set makes unit testing against DefaultHttpContext reliable).
SIGCM2.Api/Middleware/AuditActorMiddleware.cs:
- Reads JWT 'sub' claim from authenticated HttpContext.User, parses to int,
stores as audit:actorUserId. Anonymous / non-numeric sub leaves it unset.
SIGCM2.Infrastructure/Audit/AuditContext.cs (IAuditContext scoped impl):
- Reads Items entries via IHttpContextAccessor. Returns null / Guid.Empty
when no HttpContext is available (jobs, tests without middleware).
- ActorRoleId intentionally null for now — rol code → id resolution is
deferred; the logger may resolve it at persist time in a later batch.
DI registration (Infrastructure/DependencyInjection.cs):
- services.AddScoped<IAuditContext, AuditContext>()
Tests (Strict TDD):
- CorrelationIdMiddlewareTests (6): generates/preserves/handles-malformed
correlation id, sets response header, captures ip/ua, calls next.
- AuditActorMiddlewareTests (5): authenticated/anonymous/no-sub/non-numeric/
calls-next.
- AuditContextTests (7): reads from Items, null-http-context defaults,
ActorRoleId currently null.
Suite: 355/355 Application.Tests + 141/141 Api.Tests = 496/496 passing.
Refs: sdd/udt-010-auditoria-trazabilidad/{spec#REQ-AUD-3/9, design#D-2, tasks#B4}
