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SIG-CM2.0/src/api/SIGCM2.Infrastructure/DependencyInjection.cs

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using System.Security.Cryptography;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration;
using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens;
using SIGCM2.Application.Abstractions;
using SIGCM2.Application.Abstractions.Persistence;
using SIGCM2.Application.Abstractions.Security;
feat(infra): JsonSanitizer + AuditOptions binding (UDT-010 B3) Adds the metadata sanitization layer per #REQ-AUD-5: SIGCM2.Infrastructure/Audit/JsonSanitizer.cs (static class): - Sanitize(object?, IReadOnlyCollection<string>) -> string? - Serializes via System.Text.Json + JsonNode recursive traversal. - Strips blacklisted keys at every nesting level (objects + arrays). - Case-insensitive match (ToLowerInvariant on both sides). - Null input -> null output (never throws). - Output is always valid JSON (ISJSON=1 compatible — satisfies AuditEvent CHECK). SIGCM2.Application/Audit/AuditOptions.cs: - Documented the IConfiguration array-binding quirk: config is ADDITIVE (append at higher indices), not REPLACE. Intentional for security — defaults like 'password'/'token'/'cvv' must not be silently dropped. SIGCM2.Infrastructure/DependencyInjection.cs: - services.Configure<AuditOptions>(configuration.GetSection(AuditOptions.SectionName)) wired in AddInfrastructure(). Tests (Strict TDD, RED -> GREEN): - JsonSanitizerTests (10): null/empty-blacklist/flat/nested/arrays/case-insensitive/ primitives/round-trip-valid-json/string-as-value/default-keys-effective. - AuditOptionsBindingTests (2): defaults when section absent + additive override. One test needed adjustment during GREEN: 'AlreadySerializedJsonString' originally asserted against an encoding-specific literal; rewrote to use JsonDocument round-trip (validates behavior without coupling to encoder quirks). Suite: 348/348 Application.Tests + 130/130 Api.Tests = 478/478 passing. Refs: sdd/udt-010-auditoria-trazabilidad/{spec#REQ-AUD-5, design#D-5, tasks#B3}
2026-04-16 13:28:37 -03:00
using SIGCM2.Application.Audit;
using SIGCM2.Application.Auth;
using SIGCM2.Infrastructure.Http;
using SIGCM2.Infrastructure.Messaging;
using SIGCM2.Infrastructure.Persistence;
using SIGCM2.Infrastructure.Security;
namespace SIGCM2.Infrastructure;
public static class DependencyInjection
{
public static IServiceCollection AddInfrastructure(
this IServiceCollection services,
IConfiguration configuration)
{
// Database
var connectionString = configuration.GetConnectionString("SqlServer")
?? throw new InvalidOperationException("Missing ConnectionStrings:SqlServer");
services.AddSingleton(new SqlConnectionFactory(connectionString));
services.AddScoped<IUsuarioRepository, UsuarioRepository>();
services.AddScoped<IRefreshTokenRepository, RefreshTokenRepository>();
services.AddScoped<IRolRepository, RolRepository>();
services.AddScoped<IPermisoRepository, PermisoRepository>();
services.AddScoped<IRolPermisoRepository, RolPermisoRepository>();
// JWT Options — bound lazily via IOptions so tests can override via ConfigureWebHost
services.Configure<JwtOptions>(configuration.GetSection("Jwt"));
// Also expose as JwtOptions directly for convenience (resolves via IOptions<JwtOptions>)
services.AddSingleton<JwtOptions>(sp => sp.GetRequiredService<IOptions<JwtOptions>>().Value);
// AuthOptions (Application layer) — populated from the same Jwt config section
services.AddSingleton<AuthOptions>(sp =>
{
var opts = sp.GetRequiredService<JwtOptions>();
return new AuthOptions
{
AccessTokenMinutes = opts.AccessTokenMinutes,
RefreshTokenDays = opts.RefreshTokenDays,
};
});
// RSA key pair — loaded lazily as singletons from the fully-resolved JwtOptions
services.AddSingleton<RSA>(sp =>
{
var opts = sp.GetRequiredService<JwtOptions>();
return RsaKeyLoader.LoadPrivateKey(opts);
});
services.AddSingleton<RsaSecurityKey>(sp =>
{
var opts = sp.GetRequiredService<JwtOptions>();
return new RsaSecurityKey(RsaKeyLoader.LoadPublicKey(opts));
});
services.AddScoped<IJwtService>(sp =>
new JwtService(sp.GetRequiredService<RSA>(), sp.GetRequiredService<JwtOptions>()));
services.AddScoped<IPasswordHasher, BcryptPasswordHasher>();
services.AddSingleton<IRefreshTokenGenerator, RefreshTokenGenerator>();
services.AddHttpContextAccessor();
services.AddScoped<IClientContext, ClientContext>();
feat(infra): JsonSanitizer + AuditOptions binding (UDT-010 B3) Adds the metadata sanitization layer per #REQ-AUD-5: SIGCM2.Infrastructure/Audit/JsonSanitizer.cs (static class): - Sanitize(object?, IReadOnlyCollection<string>) -> string? - Serializes via System.Text.Json + JsonNode recursive traversal. - Strips blacklisted keys at every nesting level (objects + arrays). - Case-insensitive match (ToLowerInvariant on both sides). - Null input -> null output (never throws). - Output is always valid JSON (ISJSON=1 compatible — satisfies AuditEvent CHECK). SIGCM2.Application/Audit/AuditOptions.cs: - Documented the IConfiguration array-binding quirk: config is ADDITIVE (append at higher indices), not REPLACE. Intentional for security — defaults like 'password'/'token'/'cvv' must not be silently dropped. SIGCM2.Infrastructure/DependencyInjection.cs: - services.Configure<AuditOptions>(configuration.GetSection(AuditOptions.SectionName)) wired in AddInfrastructure(). Tests (Strict TDD, RED -> GREEN): - JsonSanitizerTests (10): null/empty-blacklist/flat/nested/arrays/case-insensitive/ primitives/round-trip-valid-json/string-as-value/default-keys-effective. - AuditOptionsBindingTests (2): defaults when section absent + additive override. One test needed adjustment during GREEN: 'AlreadySerializedJsonString' originally asserted against an encoding-specific literal; rewrote to use JsonDocument round-trip (validates behavior without coupling to encoder quirks). Suite: 348/348 Application.Tests + 130/130 Api.Tests = 478/478 passing. Refs: sdd/udt-010-auditoria-trazabilidad/{spec#REQ-AUD-5, design#D-5, tasks#B3}
2026-04-16 13:28:37 -03:00
// UDT-010: Audit options (SanitizedKeys blacklist) — overridable via appsettings "Audit".
services.Configure<AuditOptions>(configuration.GetSection(AuditOptions.SectionName));
// Dispatcher
services.AddScoped<IDispatcher, Dispatcher>();
// JWT Bearer authentication
services.AddAuthentication(JwtBearerDefaults.AuthenticationScheme)
.AddJwtBearer();
// Post-configure JWT Bearer — wire RSA public key + validation params from resolved options.
// MapInboundClaims=false: preserve JWT claim names as-is ("sub", "rol", etc.).
// Without this, the middleware maps "sub" → ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier and breaks User.FindFirst("sub").
services.AddOptions<JwtBearerOptions>(JwtBearerDefaults.AuthenticationScheme)
.PostConfigure<RsaSecurityKey, JwtOptions>((jwtBearerOpts, rsaKey, jwtOpts) =>
{
jwtBearerOpts.MapInboundClaims = false;
jwtBearerOpts.TokenValidationParameters = new TokenValidationParameters
{
ValidateIssuerSigningKey = true,
IssuerSigningKey = rsaKey,
ValidateIssuer = true,
ValidIssuer = jwtOpts.Issuer,
ValidateAudience = true,
ValidAudience = jwtOpts.Audience,
ValidateLifetime = true,
ClockSkew = TimeSpan.Zero,
RoleClaimType = "rol",
NameClaimType = "name"
};
});
return services;
}
}